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Let beholders behold: Can banks see beyond oil booms and mitigate the 
Dutch disease? 
 
Morakinyo O. Adetutu a†, John E. Ebireria , Victor Murindeb and Kayode A. Odusanyaa 
 
ABSTRACT 
While the potential role of oil booms in crowding out the tradable sector is well documented 
in the Dutch disease literature, the potential contribution of bank lending behaviour to the oil 
resource curse syndrome remains largely unexplored. In this paper, we investigate contrasting 
variations in bank credit flows to the tradable (manufacturing) and non-tradable (service) 
sectors, across 14 oil-rich economies during 1994-2017, in order to shed light on whether bank 
lending behaviour mitigates or accentuates the syndrome. We uncover new evidence of 
significant contraction in the manufacturing sector share of bank credit during oil booms, while 
the service sector share of bank lending expands. Overall, our results are robust to alternative 
tests and unequivocally reject the hypothesis that banks can see beyond oil booms by allocating 
credit across sectors in a manner that mimics countervailing monetary policy to intermediate 
oil windfalls and mitigate the Dutch disease. Rather, bank sectoral credit allocation accentuates 
the Dutch disease by crowding out the tradable sector. 
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1. Introduction 
One common explanation for the poor economic performance of resource-rich economies is 
the so-called Dutch disease which refers to the adverse effects of a natural resource boom on 
the tradable sector (see, for example, Papyrakis, 2017). The explanation follows from the 
seminal proposition by Corden and Neary (1982), which attributes the contraction of the 
tradable sector to the sharp inflow of extra foreign currency arising from a resource boom1. For 
instance, Ismail (2010) demonstrates that a 10% increase in the size of a commodity boom is 
associated with a 3.4% fall in manufacturing value added. While the large literature on the 
Dutch disease, or natural resource curse, embodies a range of mechanisms through which 
natural resource booms can impact economic performance2, the overarching conclusion is that 
the tradable sector is crowded out, for example via reduced investments in the manufacturing 
sector (Gylfason and Zoega, 2006; Yuxiang and Chen, 2011; Mideksa, 2013; and Van Der 
Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2017). 
 The intuition behind the crowding out argument is that natural resource exploitation 
results in the contraction of the tradable sector by shifting productive resources toward the non-
tradable sector (Krugman, 1987; Gylfason et al., 1999). In addition, the analysis by Benigno 
and Fornato (2014) indicates that consumption booms fueled by large income inflows often 
require resource shifts toward the non-tradable sector3. However, Allcott and Keniston (2017) 
present new evidence which suggests that in the US, natural resources beneﬁt producer 
economies, contrary to the “Natural Resource Curse” syndrome. By combining new data on 
oil and gas endowments with Census of Manufactures microdata, it is found that local wages 
                                                            
1 One strand of the literature provides some empirical evidence on the positive contributions of natural resource 
discovery and extraction towards economic growth (e.g. Sachs, 2007; Alexeev and Conrad, 2009; Mideksa, 
2013). See Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2017) for a comprehensive and balanced review of the large Dutch 
disease literature. 
2 For example, exchange rate effects, weak institutions, rent seeking and corruption, armed conflicts.  
3 Benigno and Fornato (2014) focus on financial resource curse arising from large capital inflows triggered by 
falling interest rate; this is analogous to the sharp income inflow arising from a natural resource boom. 
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rise during oil and gas booms, but manufacturing is not crowded out, rather the sector grows 
overall, driven by upstream and locally-traded subsectors. 
It may well be the case that, in the light of new evidence which challenges the received 
wisdom about the Dutch disease associated with oil booms, there are good grounds for 
exploring additional factors that may explain resource shifts from the tradable to the non-
tradable sector or otherwise. Interestingly, in a recent critical survey of the natural resource 
curse, Badeeb et al. (2017) call for new research that explores mechanisms through which 
natural resources affect economic outcomes, especially by considering factors closely 
associated with economic growth. Similarly, Beck (2016) highlights that the linkages between 
natural resource exploitation and financial sector development remain under-researched. For 
example, the existing literature is unable to shed much light on the hitherto unexplored but 
pertinent questions regarding the role of the financial system in sectoral resource shifts in 
response to natural resource booms. To the best of our knowledge, there is no direct empirical 
evidence on whether (and the extent to which) the pattern of bank credit flows to tradable and 
non-tradable sectors of oil- producing economies might contribute to the Dutch disease. 
 Indeed, the role of the financial sector in these sectoral shifts remains unclear. In 
particular, two observations can be inferred from the sparse literature exploring the linkages 
between commodity markets and financial systems. The first observation suggests the 
existence of a natural resource curse in the financial sectors of resource-rich countries (e.g. Van 
der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2009; Beck, 2011; Beck and Poelhekke, 2017). The point here is that 
low levels of financial development is a consequence of resource abundance. A second 
observation attempts to associate financial sector instability with negative commodity price 
shocks (e.g. Kinda et al., 2016; Agarwal et al., 2017).   
Nevertheless, since it is well established in the literature that well-functioning banking 
systems ensure efficient capital allocation by channeling funds to the most productive 
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investment projects towards stimulating economic growth (Levine, 1997; 2005), and given the 
resource shifts required for the Dutch disease to occur, it becomes crucial to investigate whether 
(and the extent to which) the financial system contributes to the Dutch disease syndrome. Do 
sectoral lending patterns accentuate or mitigate the crowding-out of the tradable sector? To 
what extent do banks in oil-rich countries countervail the Dutch disease through their credit 
screening and efficient intermediation function? Do banks see beyond oil price booms?  
In this paper, we investigate the direct empirical relationship between oil booms and 
bank lending behaviour. We fill an important gap in the literature, by focusing on the sectoral 
credit allocation role of banks in the Dutch disease syndrome. Specifically, our contribution to 
existing literature is threefold. Firstly, we open a new line of enquiry into bank behaviour 
during commodity booms. The analysis of sectoral credit flows during commodity booms could 
offer rare insight into the potential role of credit markets in mitigating the Dutch disease. Our 
underlying intuition is that, through intermediation and efficient capital allocation, banks can 
see beyond the oil boom4, and hence behave as if they were implementing countervailing 
monetary policies that smoothen economic performance over oil boom cycles towards avoiding 
the Dutch disease. From a policy point of view, this issue is strategically important because of 
the need to determine if monetary authorities can rely on banks’ efficient capital allocation 
business to carry out countervailing policies.  
Secondly, bank credit allocation patterns in resource-rich countries could provide 
useful information on the strategic response of banks to commodity price movements. We 
argue that the strategic lending behaviour by banks during commodity booms is an implicit 
indicator of financial development across these economies. Intuitively, if the financial systems 
in these countries adequately play their efficient credit allocation role, there is great potential 
                                                            
4 This idea is based on the screening and credit rationing functions of banks. We discuss this idea in greater 
detail in our theoretical framework.  
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for them to countervail the Dutch disease syndrome by slowing the rate of resource shifts from 
the tradable sector.5 In short, we suggest that the extent to which sectoral bank credit flows are 
decoupled from commodity market procyclicality is an implicit indicator of financial system 
development across resource-rich economies. It is also a measure of the potential resilience of 
the macroeconomy to adverse commodity shocks.  
Thirdly, because this study employs disaggregated sectoral bank credit data, it allows 
us to contribute to the literature on the sectoral concentration of bank assets, which is a major 
historical contributor to banking sector health (see Westernhagen et al., 2004). For instance, 
concentrated bank credit to the consumption driven non-tradable sectors might potentially 
impose huge social costs and undesirable outcomes during negative price shocks. This speaks 
to the “flight to quality” arguments by Bernanke, et al. (1996) that borrowers who are likely to 
bear the adverse effects of exogenous shocks should, in principle, experience reduced bank 
credit access, relative to other firms or sectors. Moreover, given that many resource-dependent 
countries are developing economies, the macroeconomic implications of unfavorable bank 
credit allocation to tradable sectors are huge because productivity grows faster in the main 
tradable sectors (i.e. manufacturing and agriculture), relative to the non-tradable sector (Duarte 
and Restuccia, 2010; Benigno and Fornato, 2014).6  
Using monthly sectoral bank loan data for a sample of 14 oil producing countries over 
the period 1994-2017, we empirically test the hypothesis that banks intermediate oil windfalls 
by allocating credit as if they were conducting countervailing monetary policy to mitigate the 
Dutch disease. Specifically, we investigate the relationship between sectoral bank credit shares 
and oil price booms using an instrumental variables (IV) approach that addresses the potential 
                                                            
5 This line of argument crucially speaks to the assumption that banks can see beyond the commodity boom, 
perhaps because the accompanying consumption boom that fuels the non-tradable sector growth are driven by 
largely unpredictable and volatile commodity price trends.  
6 Benigno and Fornato (2014) demonstrate that, due to their superior scope for productivity gains, the tradable 
sector is mainly the engine of growth of the economy. Hence, resource reallocation away from the tradable 
sectors will slow down technology absorption and result in periods of low overall productivity growth. 
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endogeneity of oil price booms arising from country-specific events that impact oil markets. 
We uncover new evidence that oil booms are associated with contraction (expansion) in 
manufacturing (service) sector share of bank credit. These findings remain robust after a battery 
of sensitivity tests such as accounting for country-specific effects, addressing endogeneity 
concerns, employing alternative measures of oil booms, and conducting a microeconometric 
case study using bank-level data for the entire Kazakh banking industry.  
Overall, we reject the hypothesis that banks can see beyond oil booms by allocating 
credit as if they were implementing countervailing monetary policy against the Dutch disease. 
The implication of our results is that the sectoral bank credit allocation pattern is potentially a 
channel through which productive resources are shifted toward the non-tradable sector at the 
expenses of the tradable sector. Hence, public policy authorities across the sample countries 
have to take on the role of seeing beyond the oil boom as they cannot rely on the banks’ efficient 
capital allocation business to carry out countervailing policies. The findings from our 
microeconometric case study of Kazakh banks underscores this point of view.  
The remainder of the paper is structured into five parts. Section 2 discusses the related 
literature and highlights the gap that this paper attempts to fill. In Section 3, we provide a 
theoretical framework to underpin our empirical model. The model is presented in Section 4, 
together with discussion of estimation and testing procedures. Section 5 describes the data and 
descriptive statistics. In particular, we discuss in detail some potential measurement issues 
implicit in deriving a measure of oil price booms. Section 6 discusses the empirical results, 
along with robustness and sensitivity tests on the impact of oil booms on bank credit patterns. 
Section 7 offers the conclusion of the study and highlights the key policy implications. 
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2. Related literature 
While the economics literature features important contributions to our understanding of the 
Dutch disease phenomenon, a relatively under-researched area relates to the importance of 
financial development for natural resource rich countries (Beck, 2016). A critical issue is 
whether financial the financial sector plays a role in amplifying or mitigating the Dutch disease 
problem, especially regarding the role of banks in allocating oil windfalls during periods of 
commodity shocks. Two strands of the literature are relevant here. The first theme suggests the 
existence of a natural resource curse in the financial sectors of resource-rich countries (e.g. Van 
der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2009; Beck, 2011; Yuxiang and Chen, 2011; Bhattacharyya and 
Hodler, 2013; Kurronen, 2015; and Beck and Poelhekke, 2017). Findings in this literature 
appear to be consistent with the view that a causal relationship exists between resource 
abundance, resource dependence and financial development. For instance, Samargandi et al., 
(2014) and Allegret et al., (2014) find that a healthy financial system lowers the effect of 
commodity volatility7. Similarly, Yuxiang and Chen (2011) show that resource-rich provinces 
in China experience a slower pace of financial development than resource-poor provinces, 
indicating a negative relationship between resource abundance and financial development. This 
finding is consistent with Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2013) and Beck and Poelhekke (2017) 
who found a negative impact of natural resource revenues on financial development when 
political institutions are weak. In addition, Kurronen (2015) provides empirical evidence to 
show that banking sectors in resource-dependent economies tend to be smaller, supporting the 
view by Lin et al. (2009) that financial systems are expected to reflect the production structure 
of the economy and suggesting that large firms in the dominant resource-based sectors are 
expected to benefit more.   
                                                            
7 Nili and Rastad (2007), Beck (2011), Cespedes and Velasco (2012), Samargandi et al. (2014) and Allegret et 
al. (2014) are some studies that come up with similar findings.   
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A second but sparse strand of the relevant literature explores the impact of negative 
commodity shocks on bank health in resource rich economies, e.g. credit growth (Agarwal, et 
al., 2017), as well as on financial sector stability (Kinda et al., 2016). More specifically, Kinda 
et al., (2016) examine the impact of commodity price shocks on financial fragility and show 
that negative shocks to commodity prices may increase financial sector fragility as well as 
increasing the possibility of systemic banking crises. Along similar lines, Agarwal et al. (2017) 
examine how the banking sector, through its financial intermediary and lending activities, 
transfers the impact of commodity price changes to the real economy. They show the adverse 
effects of commodity price shocks on bank lending, particularly for low income countries and 
countries that are natural resource-dependent.   
While the above strands of the literature examine the impact of resource abundance on 
financial development and explore the implications of commodity price shocks on the financial 
sector, it remains unclear whether a reverse-causal effect runs from the financial sector to the 
occurrence of the Dutch disease. This study directly investigates bank lending behaviour during 
oil price booms in order to unravel the extent to which this bank behavior may contribute to 
the Dutch disease. Unlike previous studies that treat the level of financial sector development 
as a consequence of resource abundance or commodity shocks, we explore the reverse 
implication of bank credit allocation behaviour on the Dutch disease. 
3. Analytical framework 
3.1. Theoretical considerations 
We follow the classic framework of Corden and Neary (1982) and Corden (1984) by assuming 
that each country in our sample has an economy that is characterized by a non-tradable sector 
N (e.g. services) and two other sectors including the booming sector B (i.e. oil sector) and the 
lagging tradable sector L (e.g. manufacturing sector). In this framework, we assume that output 
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in each sector requires sector-specific capital and labour8. In line with previous studies (e.g. 
Beck, 2011), we focus on the most common spending effect whereby the oil windfall is spent 
into the economy (e.g. by the government or factor owners), raising the price of N relative to L 
since N is a normal good with a positive income elasticity. In short, L is weakened by the real 
appreciation in the relative prices in terms of N, drawing factor inputs out of L into N while 
also strongly stimulating demand for N relative to L.  
3.2. Bank credit policy and resource allocation 
We start addressing the potential contribution of bank lending behavior to the factor shifts 
described above. We seek to analyze the relationship between bank credit allocation and oil 
booms. Our main task is to demonstrate whether bank credit policies are correlated with oil 
booms across the sample countries. Consider an economy with banks that have many potential 
borrowers across several sectors of the economy. Using a classic one-period model of bank 
credit allocation decision, we assume that each of the banks has two assets, credit or loans (C) 
and securities such as treasury bills (A); and two types of liabilities, namely capital (K) and 
deposits (D), so we write the linear balance sheet constraint (suppressing subscripts and 
ignoring other arguments such as required capital or asset ratio requirements, etc) as: 
          𝐴 + 𝐶 = 𝐾 + 𝐷      [1] 
The market for C and D are imperfectly competitive and are influenced by the market interest 
rate. For simplicity, we assume that banks maximize profits 𝜋 as the margin between interest 
income on loans 𝑟𝐿𝐿 and interest expense on deposits 𝑟𝐷𝐷 less loan losses (𝛿𝐿): 
            𝜋 = (𝑟𝐿 − 𝛿)𝐿 − 𝑟𝐷𝐷      [2] 
                                                            
8 Labour is assumed to be mobile across the three sectors, towards equalizing wages. 
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One critical attribute of the analysis above is that the size of 𝜋 is a function of the efficiency or 
quality of the bank’s credit allocation which directly influences 𝛿, a measure of uncertainty or 
bad loan outcome. Hence, banks must perform a screening function to distinguish between 
good and bad risks in order to maximize 𝜋. This leads us to postulate that credit markets are 
different from standard markets, in that excess demand for credit is an ongoing phenomenon 
in the market such that many credit applications are not met. Hence, credit allocation is based 
on a rationing system9 which allows us to motivate our empirical credit allocation model as 
more of a supply schedule than a demand model. In this supply decision model, the financial 
system has to screen loan applications and ration credit.  
3.2.1. Credit allocation as a public good 
We assume that banks are faced with a range of projects across different sectors of the economy 
where for each project p in sector s there is a probability of returns R with different probability 
distribution across firm-sectors. However, banks cannot absolutely determine the riskiness of 
a project, so there is scope for imperfect or asymmetrical information10 and uncertainty which 
is embodied in 𝛿. Hence, Jaffee and Stiglitz (1990) suggest that bank screening functions are 
front and center in the banking system allocation function. It is argued that the efficiency of 
credit allocation in the economy depends on the reliability of the borrower screening and 
classification function. The “public good” element of this function ensures that adverse market 
or sectoral conditions may be managed and mitigated in ways that the overall return to the 
society or economy is net positive. This is especially true in cases when an entire borrowing 
sector is hit by an (unpredictable) systematic adverse shock such as an oil price shock. In other 
words, there is a systematic sectoral component of uncertainty (Rajan, 1994), which explains 
                                                            
9 See Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) for a classic treatment of credit rationing by banks. 
10 Jaffee and Stiglitz (1990) assume that borrowers know the expected return and risks of their projects while 
banks only know the expected risk and return of the average project in the sector or economy 
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Stiglitz’s (1993; pp.23) view on the resource allocation role of banks in an economy, arguing 
that “if they fail, not only will the sector's profits be lower than they would otherwise have been, but 
the performance of the entire economic system may be impaired”11.  
4. Empirical strategy 
4.1.  The empirical model 
Following from the literature survey in Section 2 and the theoretical idea on bank screening 
and allocation functions in Section 3, we hypothesize as follows: 
 H0. Banks see beyond oil booms by allocating credit as if they were conducting 
countervailing monetary policy to intermediate oil windfalls and mitigate the Dutch 
disease; 
 HA. Bank sectoral credit allocation accentuates the Dutch disease by crowding out tradable 
sectors. 
The null hypothesis (H0) and the alternative hypothesis (HA) derive from the Dutch disease 
phenomenon, such that they could help deepen our understanding of how banks’ lending 
behavior in resource rich economies contribute to amplifying or mitigating the Dutch disease. 
In order to generate the testable form of the two hypotheses and empirically examine the 
relationship between oil price booms and sectoral credit allocation, we specify and estimate the 
following baseline panel data regression model: 
                  𝐶𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝜸𝒛𝑘𝑖𝑡
′ + 𝜇𝑖 + ε𝑖𝑡                       [3] 
where 𝐶𝑘𝑖𝑡 is the credit share of sector k in country i in period t, 𝐵𝑖𝑡 is the oil boom variable for 
country i in time t, 𝒛𝑘𝑖𝑡
′  is a vector of sector-specific, bank industry and macroeconomic 
characteristics which traditionally influence sectoral credit allocation according to the 
                                                            
11 See Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Galindo and Micco (2004) for some empirical evidence suggesting that 
bank capital allocation towards sectors with the best economic viability can stimulate economic growth. 
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literature, 𝜇𝑖 represents country specific effects, ε𝑖𝑡 is a random error term; 𝛼1 is our parameter 
of interest which measures the extent to which oil booms influence sectoral credit shares.  
4.2.  Instrumental variables (IV) approach 
The classic problem with the estimation of [3] is the potential endogeneity of the oil boom 
variable. The identification of the parameters in [3] is a problem. Additionally, an underlying 
simultaneity problem arises from the fact that international oil prices are endogenously 
determined in a global supply-and-demand system. Although, we can observe market oil prices 
as equilibrium points of a reduced form relationship between oil supply and demand functions, 
not all market covariates are observed. Moreover, other country-specific developments such as 
geopolitical events and market power in the global market power12 could also influence world 
oil price movements (see Kilian, 2009). Also, each country in our data sample has its own 
economic, political, and institutional characteristics which might be correlated with other 
regressors in the model in [3]. With panel data fixed-effects models, we can control for some 
of the country-specific effects, but other omitted variable and time varying influences are likely 
to be embedded in the random shock ε𝑖𝑡 within the model, which will bias parameter estimates.  
Given the discussions above on the oil demand and supply covariates along with the 
other model complications, we expect that the fixed and time-varying country-specific factors 
implicit in 𝜇𝑖 and ε𝑖𝑡 are correlated with the boom variable 𝐵𝑖𝑡 in the model [3]. Hence, this 
identification problem implies that ordinary least squares (OLS) methods will not yield 
efficient or consistent estimates of the effects of oil booms on bank lending behavior. For this 
matter, we resort to an instrumental variables (IV) approach. Ideally, we need “good 
instruments” that possess the three key attributes of relevance, validity and orthogonality for 
the IV estimation to be efficient and consistent. To address this challenge, we can derive IV 
                                                            
12 For instance, consider the market power possessed by Saudi Arabia as a swing oil producer that could 
influence global oil prices by manipulating its supply levels.  
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candidates for the oil price boom variable using exclusion restrictions on the demand and 
supply side of the oil market system. Specifically, we consider exogenous demand shifters that 
do not shift market supply and vice versa, or even exogenous factors that might influence both 
the demand and supply sides of the market (see Manski, 2003).  
Guided by theory and empirical evidence, we instrument for the oil boom variable using 
data on (i) weather (ii) world oil rig count and (iii) variable cost of oil production in the US.13 
For weather, we use the average global temperature which we take from the U.K. Met Office 
Hadley Centre observations datasets (Morice, et al., 2012). We take the world oil rig count data 
from Baker Hughes, Inc. database. We derive the variable cost of oil production using 
information on (a) oil and gas employees (b) man-hours (c) wages and (d) oil output. These 
series are obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (EIA). Notice that these instruments are either global or pertain to regions 
outside our sampled oil-rich countries. This ensures exogeneity of the instruments. We then 
derive country-specific versions of the instruments by normalizing these global instruments 
with country-specific shares of world oil reserves (taken from the BP Annual Statistical 
Bulletin). This weight is appealing since it preserves the exogeneity of the resulting instruments 
given that oil endowment or reserves is an exogenous, naturally occurring phenomenon.   
5. Data and descriptive statistics 
5.1. Data sample 
To investigate the relationship between sectoral allocation of credit and commodity booms, we 
draw on a number of data sources such as several issues of central banks’ statistical bulletins, 
IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS), and the database of the Energy Information 
Administration (EIA). A detailed description of variables and data sources is presented in 
                                                            
13 See Lin (2008) for some discussion. 
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Appendix A. We also exploit bank-level data for the entire Kazakh banking industry, obtained 
from the Kazakhstan Central Bank, the “National Bank of Kazakhstan”, to understand the 
channels through which oil booms influence bank lending behavior. Finally, we employ firm-
level data on manufacturing enterprises from the World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES) to 
check firm-level dependence on external finance.  
    [INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
Table 1 presents key economic indicators on income, oil contribution and financial 
development for our sample countries using 2016 data. Qatar, UAE and Bahrain have the 
highest per capita incomes, which are well in excess of the average income of $31,715 across 
the whole sample, whereas Indonesia, Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire have the lowest income levels. 
The global oil production share indicates that our sampled countries account for around half of 
world oil production with Saudi Arabia (13.4%), Russia (12.2%) and UAE (4.4%) ranking as 
the top-three producers.  
The average degree of resource dependence across our sample can be inferred from oil 
share of total goods export, which stood at 47% in 2016. Nigeria (91%), Kuwait (89%) and 
Azerbaijan (87%) appear to be the most reliant on oil, with the Latin American countries in our 
sample namely Mexico and Brazil being the least-dependent. Finally, we measure financial 
development using credit to the private sector as ratio of GDP and find that the average ratio 
for our sample is 55% with Nigeria (16%) being the least developed, in contrast to Malaysia 
(124%) and Kuwait (99%) at the top. 
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5.2.  Key variables and data sources 
Our final dataset contains monthly14 information on bank credit to the manufacturing sector 
and the service sector across 14 oil producing countries15 over the period 1994-2017, yielding 
a panel data sample of 2310 observation. We deflate all monetary values to 2012 (2012=100) 
prices using monthly Consumer Price Index (CPI) data obtained from IMF IFS database. The 
deflated series are then converted to common international unit prices using the purchasing 
power parity (PPP) conversion factors. Below, we give a brief description of the key variables. 
5.2.1. Sectoral credit 
In order to analyze bank sectoral credit allocation during commodity booms, our dependent 
variable ought to reflect the changes in a sector’s share of the banking systems total credit. 
Hence, we define and compute our dependent variable as: 
         𝐶𝑘𝑖𝑡 =
𝐿𝑘𝑖𝑡
∑ 𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑗≠𝑘
        [4] 
where 𝐶𝑘𝑖𝑡 is the credit share of sector
16 k in country i in period t, 𝐿𝑘𝑖𝑡 is the total banking 
system17 loans and advances to sector k across sampled countries and time periods, while 
                                                            
14 Our monthly data allows us exploit richer information sets from higher data frequency relative to annual data 
sets. High frequency data sets can improve our understanding of monetary policy issues (Bernanke and Boivin, 
2003). They are more appropriate for capturing volatile market conditions, which might be disguised by other 
dominating effects or obscured by relatively low-frequency data (Engle, 2004). For instance, structural shocks to 
the real oil prices often exhibit delayed reactions that are better assessed at monthly frequency (Kilian, 2009). 
15 We try to include all oil producing countries, but in the end some countries have no monthly data on sectoral 
credit allocation. In some cases, some statistical bulletins do not offer the granular sectoral classifications that 
we employ in this study. For instance, these statistical bulletins only offer domestic credit allocation based on 
total “private” and “public” sector credit distribution. It is for these reasons that our dataset covers the 14 
countries for which we could gather reliable data. 
16 The sectors in our analysis are tradable sector (i.e. manufacturing) and non-tradable sector (i.e. services). 
17 Although we use banking sector-wide flow of credit to industries from statutory central bank credit registers, 
we considered bank-level allocation. However, we note the challenge that data on bank sectoral exposures are 
not directly available from commercial databases. Even when we considered bank-level sectoral using publicly 
available financial statements, we observed that that the resulting database will be too limited in terms of the 
time series dimension (e.g. for many banks across sampled countries, data is mainly available for around 5 
years) due largely to missing observations attributable to high frequency of entry and exit in the banking sector, 
or mergers and acquisition. This limited timeframe is inadequate to study the evolution of oil price booms. In 
addition, our detailed checks also demonstrate that the available sectoral loans data is limited to very large 
banks, which might not be representative of the overall banking system’s business loan portfolio. Nevertheless, 
we gain some bank-level evidence using a restricted database of the Kazakh banks. 
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∑ 𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑗≠𝑘  is the total loans and advances across all k sectors across country i during period t. 
The use of sectoral loan shares, as opposed to total loans across sectors ensures that we can 
capture or isolate the evolution of the relative importance of different sectors in the credit policy 
or allocation across sampled banking sectors. This approach is necessary, given that credit to 
the economy will likely move in certain directions during extreme economy events or shocks. 
For instance, credit is likely to expand across all sectors of the economy during economic 
booms and vice versa, albeit the rate of expansion or contraction may differ across sectors.  
The compilation of a dataset suitable for our analysis required a major effort in terms 
of data on the sectoral breakdown of lending exposures. Specifically, we use sectoral credit 
composition data, which we collected from several hundreds of central bank monthly statistical 
bulletins across 13 oil-producers.  
5.2.2. Defining and verifying the strength of oil price booms 
Our main independent variable is oil price boom. While the definition of an economic boom is 
a straightforward matter, constructing its quantitative measure is a complicated matter. The 
complication arises from many considerations including (but not limited to) the potential 
endogeneity issues (see Plante and Dhaliwal, 2017) as well as the quantitative precision of such 
boom measure (see Wu and Cavallo, 2012).  
Given these considerations, we set out to construct commodity boom measures as 
follows. Our starting point is that we conceptually define a boom as a period or episode of 
major and persistent deviations from an observed trend towards high states (Hamilton, 1989; 
Agnello and Schuknecht, 2011). To this end, we define an oil boom using the conceptual idea 
that it refers to situations where actual market prices substantially exceed expected prices (see 
Plante and Dhaliwal, 2017).  
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Consequently, we derive our oil boom measure as the percent deviations between actual 
and forecast oil price in period t,  
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑡 = {
100 ∗
(𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑡 − 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑡)
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑡
, during time 𝑡
0,            otherwise                                               
 
                 [5] 
We use real spot prices as a proxy for actual prices, while the forecast prices are represented 
by real oil future contract data. Both price series are obtained from the EIA database18. The 
rationale for using futures prices (as a measure of oil price forecasts) is that they embody market 
operators’ best views and expectations about prices19. An added advantage of this approach is 
that these market expectations are accessible or observable by all oil producing countries.  
A second issue which we address is heterogeneity in terms of the size and relevance of 
the boom variable. It is plausible to imagine that an oil boom is likely to take heterogenous 
relevance or have varying levels of impact across oil-rich countries, depending on the degree 
of oil dependence across sampled countries. For this reason, following Deaton and Miller 
(1995) and Combes, et al. (2014), we normalize the boom measure in equation [5] using 
country-specific weights as follows, 
         𝑤𝑖 =
𝐸𝑉𝑏
𝑜𝑖𝑙
𝐸𝑉𝑏
𝑇𝑜𝑡             [6] 
Where, 𝑤𝑖 is a measure of oil dependence derived as the ratio of the value of oil exports 𝐸𝑉𝑏
𝑜𝑖𝑙 
to total exports 𝐸𝑉𝑏
𝑇𝑜𝑡 in base year b20. These country weights are sensible because the 
                                                            
18 These oil price series are deflated using Consumer Price Index (CPI) data and normalised to (2012=100). 
19 For instance, in a survey by Hamilton (2009), it is shown that, at the minimum, future oil prices embody 
rational expectations about future spot prices. Similarly, Wu and McCallum (2005) compare the forecasting 
performance of “futures-spot spread” with those of other forecasting models and they find that the futures-spot 
spread approach outperformed the other models, especially when the forecasting horizons are within few 
months, as is the case in this study where we use monthly data.  
20 We use 2012 as our base year.  
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implication, size or relevance of an oil price boom for a country will depend on the degree of 
its economic dependence on oil. Furthermore, given that the resulting (fixed) weights are 
applied to the time-varying commodity boom variable for the different time periods, the 
resulting boom variable: (i) retains the movements in global oil prices in equation [5]; (ii) 
embodies country-specific conditions via equation [6]; and (iii) mitigates the endogeneity 
concerns arising from unpredictability and country-induced supply side shocks.21 Although, as 
noted by Musayev (2014), one limitation of this weighting scheme is that it might omit changes 
in the term of trade structure of sampled countries or even short-term dynamics arising from 
production shocks. For this reason, we explore alternative boom measures as part of our 
robustness tests. 
5.2.3. Strength of commodity price boom 
We verify the reliability of our boom measure by assessing its strengths or correlation with 
conventional measures of commodity shocks from the literature. We hypothesize that our oil 
boom measure ought to embody positive oil price shocks. Following Kinda et al. (2016), we 
retrieve positive oil price shocks as follows. First, we regress real oil prices on their lags (up to 
three lags) and a quadratic time trend, 
ln 𝑃𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑐,0 + 𝛼𝑐,1𝑡 + 𝛼𝑐,2𝑡
2 + ∑ 𝜃𝑐,𝑝
3
𝑝
ln 𝑃𝑐,𝑡−𝑝 + 𝜀𝑐,𝑡 
                 [7] 
The oil price shocks are then measured as the residuals of the regression above. Gven that 
commodity prices can be I(1) or I(2), this shock has the added advantage that it makes the 
shock measure stationary, and it removes the predictable element from the stationary process 
(Kinda et al., 2016). Secondly, since this study relates to price booms, we are only interested 
in the positive shocks, so we normalize the residuals by rescaling them between 0 and 1. 
                                                            
21 For instance, new oil discoveries or geopolitical events.  
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Finally, in order to test the robustness of the boom measure, we regress the boom variable 
(from equations 5 and 6) on the positive oil shock variable (retrieved from equation 7) using 
robust standard errors. As shown in equation [8] below, the shock variable enters significantly 
at the 1% level of significance (t-statistics are reported in the parenthesis), indicating that the 
boom variable is positively associated with (or embodies/captures) positive oil price shocks. It 
is therefore powerful enough to capture consistent or persistent upswings in oil prices: 
                    𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 0.79 (5.73) + 1.94 (4.49) ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒_𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑡   [8] 
            𝑅2= 0.45  
5.3.  Banking sector and other country-specific control variables 
In addition to our main independent variable, commodity price booms, we control for an array 
of banking sector and macroeconomic characteristics such as level of sectoral output, total 
deposits, equity capital, interest rate, exchange rate, liquidity, size of the banking sector, 
institutional quality22 and an OPEC dummy23. Due to the monthly frequency of our data, we 
could not obtain data for some usual control variables, e.g. investments, GDP, trade openness, 
population density, corruption and democracy scores. Information on these variables are 
mainly available in annual frequency. However, we believe that some of the variables 
employed in our regressions capture dimensions and dynamics in these excluded variables such 
that the omitted variable problems are mitigated. For instance, we expect the sectoral output 
indices to mirror the level of investment and GDP across our sample; while our composite 
institutional quality variable should also capture the state of corruption and democracy in these 
countries.  
   
                                                            
22 See Appendix C for details on the construction of our institutional quality measure using principal component 
analysis (PCA). 
23 See Appendix A for detailed definitions and sources of the variables used in this study. 
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5.4.  Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study. The mean value 
of manufacturing share of loans is 12.5% with a standard deviation of 6.92%, compared to 
41.7% and 4.7%, respectively for the service sector. Although left-skewed, the standard 
deviations for both variables suggest considerable cross-country variation in the level of 
sectoral bank credit allocation. In particular, it is noteworthy to highlight that, on average, 
service sector share of credit is three times larger than manufacturing share of credit; bearing 
the hallmarks of the Dutch disease phenomenon. Unsurprisingly, agricultural share of bank 
credit is even much lower at 1.9% share of total credit during the period under review.  
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
6. Empirical results 
6.1. Stationarity 
We begin our econometric analysis with formal tests to examine stationarity (unit roots) for 
our panel data set. We conduct the first-generation Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) test (hereafter 
referred to as the IPS test), as well as the second-generation test of Pesaran (2007) which 
augments the IPS test by accounting for cross-sectional dependence across sampled countries 
(hereafter referred to as the CIPS test). Table B1 in the appendix presents results on  these unit 
root tests. The results indicate that the variables employed in this study are in general I(1) 
except exchange rate which is I(0). In particular, the results on both tests clearly indicate that 
the sectoral credit shares and the oil boom series are stationary variables.   
6.2. Baseline results: oil price boom and sectoral credit flows 
Next, we focus on the endogeneity of the boom measure using the Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
(DWH) procedure, which allows us test for the corresponding orthogonality condition under 
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the null hypothesis that the boom measure can be treated as exogenous within our model24. The 
test statistic, which is robust to heteroscedaticity or other violations of conditional 
homoscedasticity, is distributed as 𝜒2. This endogeneity test yields a test statistic of 15.27 with 
chi p-value = 0.000; rejecting the null that the boom variable is exogenous at conventional 
levels. This suggests that our specified model cannot be consistently estimated with OLS 
estimators under the assumption of orthogonality of the regressors. This test result therefore 
justifies an IV estimation approach. Hence in our baseline results given in Table 3, we present 
both OLS and IV estimations for the sectoral bank credit allocation models.  
The first two columns pertain to the manufacturing sector, while the third and fourth 
columns are for service sector credit regressions.  Our main analyses are based on the IV 
estimations, for which we instrument for the boom variable using global average monthly 
temperature, scaled by sampled countries’ share of world oil reserves. We note that the 
appropriateness of the IV estimation depends on the use of “good instruments” that possess the 
key attributes of relevance, validity and orthogonality. Confirming these attributes requires a 
few considerations. First, because we include fixed effects in the model, the instrument ought 
to have time and cross-sectional variations. Second, the instruments must be correlated with 
∆𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑡 and thirdly, it must be orthogonal to the firm-specific time varying elements 
remaining in the error process, ∆ε𝑖𝑡.  
The first consideration is easily verifiable, given that all our instruments (global 
temperature, variable cost of oil production in the US and worldwide oil rig count) are time-
varying variables. Additionally, cross-sectional variation in the instruments are ensured by the 
cross-country differences in share of world oil reserves (our instrument weights). For the 
                                                            
24 We consider the plausible case in which other RHS variables might be endogenous. Following from a battery 
of Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity tests on our RHS variables, we treat exchange rates as endogenous within 
our model estimations. The test results are available from the authors upon request. 
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second consideration, we resort to the strong statistical significance of the instruments in the 
first-stage IV regressions25, while the third orthogonality condition can be tested in the context 
of an overidentified model using a Sargan (1958) or Hansen (1982) test of overidentifying 
restrictions.  
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
It is noted that the p-values of the Hansen J-statistics are 0.84 and 0.82 for the 
manufacturing and services sector regressions respectively, indicating that we fail to reject the 
null hypothesis that all instruments are uncorrelated with ε𝑖𝑡. Hence, the orthogonality 
conditions are satisfied, and the over-instrumentation problem is minimized in the IV 
regressions26. In particular, the Hansen J test results are supported by a visual inspection of the 
IV and OLS estimates in Table 3, corroborating the importance of controlling for endogeneity 
of the boom variable. We observe sizable differences between the OLS and IV estimates: the 
IV estimates for both sector regressions are numerically larger than the OLS estimates of the 
boom coefficient. This is expected since the OLS estimator does not account for correlation 
between country-specific events which may influence world oil markets and prices.  
With respect to the coefficient estimates on our main dependent variable, it is clear from 
the results presented in Table 3 that oil booms are associated with contraction (expansion) of 
credit shares to the manufacturing (service) sector. The IV estimates are significant at 1% level, 
implying that banking sector credit allocation across sampled countries are pro-cyclical in a 
manner that is symptomatic of the Dutch disease: during booms, credit allocation is more 
favorable to the service sector but detrimental to the real sector (manufacturing). These findings 
are economically important as they indicate that banking sector credit flows or allocation are 
                                                            
25 See Table B2 in Appendix B. 
26 The Kleibergen and Paap (2006) underidentification and weak identification LM test statistics also reject the 
null hypotheses that the IV models are underidentified or weakly identified 
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likely to amplify the Dutch disease syndrome. This is also consistent with the view that 
financial sectors across commodity rich economies might play contributory roles in the 
resource curse. Hence, this credit allocation pattern is potentially a channel for the falling 
investment in manufacturing during commodity booms.  
We now consider the effects of the control variables in our baseline regressions, namely 
sector output, interest rate, exchange rate, size of the banking sector, liquidity, equity capital 
and customer deposits. We also control for institutional quality and OPEC membership. Their 
coefficients are largely consistent across estimators, and they appear to underpin the variation 
in results on the credit allocation across both sectors. For instance, it is to be noted that, apart 
from the coefficients on capital, the coefficients on the other controls indicate alternating signs 
that underscore the asymmetrical credit conditions across both sectors. Specifically, it appears 
that increased liquidity and larger banking sectors across sampled countries seem to favour the 
services sectors than manufacturing sectors.  
 As might be expected, countries with stronger institutions seem to allocate greater 
credit shares to manufacturing relative to the service sector. This confirms the role of strong 
institutions in the allocation of resources within economic systems (Beck et al., 2005; Hawkins, 
2006). Interestingly, OPEC countries also seem to allocate more credit to manufacturing than 
the service sector. It is not immediately clear why this is the case, but the reason for this is 
outside the scope of this paper.  The coefficient on exchange rate offers important insight on 
the currency appreciation channel of the Dutch disease phenomenon. An important element of 
the Dutch disease hypothesis is that currency appreciation hurts the real sector (manufacturing) 
since it raises their prices relative to other countries. Our real exchange rate data is the IMF’s 
real effective exchange rate (REER): the real value of a currency against a weighted average 
of several foreign currencies. An increase in the REER indicates that exports have become 
more expensive and while imports become cheaper. The exchange rate coefficients for the 
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service sector regressions are negative but not significant across the board. However, they are 
significant (and negative as well) the manufacturing sector regressions, a finding that is very 
much consistent with the impact of currency appreciation on manufacturing sectors. The results 
on capitalization is consistent with the view that both manufacturing and service sector loan 
shares are increasing in banking system capitalization. However, the bank deposits coefficients 
suggest that banks offer more to the manufacturing sector than service sector when deposits 
increase. We check the robustness of these baseline results in Table 3 using a range of 
sensitivity tests which is now discussed in turns.  
6.3.  Robustness tests: Quantile regression estimates 
There may be concerns that our empirical results are seriously affected by undue outliers in the 
empirical distribution of our data. Hence, we use a quantile regression approach which is based 
on least absolute deviations rather than least squared residuals. This allows us to check the 
effects of oil booms at different points in the conditional distribution of sectoral credit shares 
by isolating the proportion of the sample which lies on or below the quantile regression line. 
Table 4 presents the coefficient estimates of the quantile regressions across 0.1-0.9 
quantiles. It is to be noted that as the sectoral loan shares vary across quantiles, the estimated 
effect of the boom variable for the manufacturing sector is consistently negative and largely 
significant. In particular, as the manufacturing loan shares change across quantiles, the estimate 
of the oil boom effect varies reasonably in terms of magnitude and degree of statistical 
significance. The F-test statistic on the equality of the QR slope estimates which rejects the 
null that the slope estimates are equal at the 1% level. Therefore, the QR estimates are 
qualitatively analogous to the main results in Table 3.  
We now turn to the QR estimates for the service sector credit shares which are presented 
in Table 5. In line with the main results, the QR estimates of the boom effect on the service 
25 
 
sector loans are positive across the board, although most of the estimates lose statistical 
significance. Both sets of QR estimates therefore indicate that the relationship between oil price 
booms and sectoral loan shares across non-central regions or points of our data sample are 
consistent and similar to those obtained when using an approach based on the central tendency 
of probability distributions. Hence, we conclude that our results are robust to outlier problems. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
6.4.  Robustness tests: Alternative measures of oil booms 
Although we derive our boom variable from the underlying deviation of actual oil prices from 
forecast series, it is possible that this measure might incorrectly infer the magnitude of oil price 
booms, especially in instances where market expectations (upon which price forecasts are 
based) are inaccurate or misplaced. Therefore, we use an alternative oil boom variable which 
we constructed using the Hamilton’s (1996) net oil price measure (NOP)27. Consider the log 
level of monthly oil prices as 𝑜𝑝𝑡 so that the monthly changes in oil prices is given by ∆𝑜𝑝𝑡 =
(𝑜𝑝𝑡 − 𝑜𝑝𝑡−1). These changes can be decomposed into “increases only” (𝑜𝑝𝑡
+) and “decreases 
only” (𝑜𝑝𝑡
−), so that our boom measure pertains to the increases only measure 
𝑜𝑝𝑡
+ = max (0, ∆𝑜𝑝𝑡)                 [9]
    
To construct the positive NOP variable that measures oil price increases, Hamilton then 
suggested a comparison of oil prices with where they had been over the previous year, rather 
than where they were the previous month, so that the NOP is the increase from the previous 
year’s monthly high price if it is positive, but zero otherwise: 
         𝑛𝑜𝑝𝑡 = max [0, 𝑜𝑝𝑡 − max(𝑜𝑝𝑡−1, 𝑜𝑝𝑡−2, … , 𝑜𝑝𝑡−12)]             [10] 
                                                            
27 See Bjørnland (2009) and Wang, et al. (2013) for applications in financial market research.  
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Using this measure, we then derive country-specific equivalents using the weights in equation. 
[6]. Our alternative boom measure can thus be specified as  
    𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑡
2 = 𝑛𝑜𝑝𝑡 × 𝑤𝑖              [11] 
 
We employ a third, yet intuitive measure of oil boom that is based on break even oil prices 
(BEP). The external breakeven oil price is the oil price at which an oil-rich country’s current 
account balance is zero. This measure is superior to the alternative fiscal breakeven price (the 
oil price that is needed for an oil exporting country to balance its budget in time t), which 
suffers from serious limitations, despite its appeal that many oil producers rely heavily on oil 
revenue to finance their fiscal spending. Setser and Frank (2017) highlight these limitations as 
including the reality that (i) budget revenues from oil are hardly reported transparently (ii) key 
government spending is sometimes kept off-budget and (iii) fiscal accounting or calculations 
vary across countries, making accurate comparisons impossible.  
However, the external breakeven price is a more complete measure that can be 
consistently estimated and easily verified28. Intuitively, it also embodies the reality that an oil 
exporter’s currency is likely to adjust to compensate for changes in fiscal or budget positions- 
weaker currencies stimulate the local currency oil export revenue values towards stabilizing 
government revenue. Hence, we derive a third oil boom measure as the magnitude by which 
actual oil prices exceed the external break-even oil prices. This boom variable is consistent 
with the reality that such market situations carry the potential for additional fiscal spending, as 
might be obtained with the alternative fiscal breakeven prices. The external breakeven price 
(BEP) is calculated by subtracting a country’s current account balance 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 ($) from the value 
                                                            
28 See Setser and Frank (2017) for a very detailed discussion.  
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of its net oil exports revenue 𝐸𝑉𝑏
𝑜𝑖𝑙 ($) and dividing this measure by the volume of net oil 
exports (barrels): 
             𝐵𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡 =
𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
𝑜𝑖𝑙−𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝑄𝑖𝑡
𝑜𝑖𝑙                [12] 
As with the previous measures, we then derive country-specific measures on the third boom 
using country weights,  
 
      𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑡
3 = [0, (𝑜𝑝𝑡 − 𝐵𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡) ∗ 𝑤𝑖]             [13] 
 
The regression results for the two alternative boom measures are presented in Table 6.  In Table 
6, the model estimations indicate that credit contraction (expansion) to the manufacturing 
(service) sector are associated with booming oil prices. The sign on the coefficients are 
consistent across estimated models, corroborating our earlier findings. Therefore, we conclude 
that our findings are robust to alternative boom measures. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
6.5.Additional robustness checks 
There might be three outstanding but valid criticisms of our analyses so far. First, using the 
manufacturing sector as the tradable sector of oil producers might be inappropriate since the 
manufacturing sectors across these economies are weak, and may therefore face greater credit 
constraints29. Secondly, due to the above limitation, it might be argued that manufacturing 
firms in oil producing countries hardly rely on external finance. Thirdly, the challenge with 
any analysis relying on aggregated data is the difficulty to discern or disentangle firm-level 
behavior from unobserved aggregate shocks, such that changes in the outcome variables might 
                                                            
29 See Beck, et al. (2005) and Yuxiang and Chen (2011) 
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be confounded with unobserved attributes of banks. To address these issues, we undertake three 
additional tests in the following sub-sections.  
6.5.1. Alternative tradeable sector 
Firstly, we designate the agricultural sector as an alternative tradeable sector and use the loan 
shares of this sector as our alternative dependent variable in the tradeable sector regression. 
The regression results for this alternative tradable sector are presented in Table 7. Contrary to 
the previous sectoral loan share regressions, we use variable cost of oil production and number 
of oil rigs as instruments to identify the effects of oil price booms on agricultural loan share. 
Intuitively, agricultural performance (and by extension its credit prospects) may be buffeted by 
weather-related shocks, such that the weather instrument is likely to be correlated with the 
unmeasured agricultural sector outlook embedded in the random error term of the model.30 Our 
underlying finding that credit allocated to the tradeable sector contracts during oil booms 
remains intact. Hence our findings are robust to alternative tradeable sector specification or 
definition.    
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
 
6.5.2. Firm external finance dependence 
Secondly, we explore the potential criticism about the credit reliance of manufacturing sectors 
across sampled countries by investigating the level of loan dependence across a panel of 
manufacturing firms. We collect firm-level data31on manufacturing enterprises from the World 
                                                            
30 In this case the orthogonality conditions will be violated.  
31 See Appendix A for a full list of variables and definitions. 
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Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES)32. Following Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Cetorelli and 
Gambera (2001), we measure firm external finance dependence as, 
             𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡 =
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡
               [14] 
where 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡 is the total value of bank loan secured by firm i during period t while 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 is 
the firm’s production cost. We present a range of statistical measures and indicators on this 
variable in Table 8. For the whole sample, the average loan dependence amounts to 7% of firm 
cost across sampled firms, ranging from 3% in Azerbaijan to 13% in Kazakhstan. Notice that 
the standard deviations are larger than the means of loan dependence measure across the board, 
indicating that the distribution of the loan dependence variable is right-skewed. This remains 
unchanged when we evaluate these statistics at the country-level. The last column of Table 8 
contains information on the proportion of firms with disbursed bank loans during the study 
period. Across the whole sample of 1415 manufacturing firms, 637 firms (45% of sample) had 
bank loans during the period under consideration; indicating that around half of our sample 
relied on external finance. The proportion of firms relying on bank loans appears significant 
across sampled countries, indicating that a non-trivial proportion of manufacturing plants 
across our sampled oil-rich countries have bank loans. Hence, we can expect the pattern of 
bank loans across these economies to have impact on firm growth and performance.  
[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE] 
6.5.3. A closer look at bank behavior: A microeconomic case study of Kazakh banking 
industry 
So far, we find a strong association between oil booms and bank credit allocation pattern for 
the period 1994-2017. However, as we stated previously, a micro-econometric approach allows 
                                                            
32 The WBES is a stratified random sample survey of a representative sample of manufacturing and service 
firms across the private sectors of covered countries. The resulting sample covered in Table 8 is based on data 
spanning 7 of the sampled countries, as countries not covered by the WBES are unavoidably omitted from the 
sample. 
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us to disentangle bank-level credit allocation behavior from other macro effects. This also 
mitigates concerns about changes in the outcome variables being confounded with unobserved 
attributes of banks. Thanks to having a panel dataset constructed using confidential monthly 
data covering all banks in Kazakhstan33 over the period 2008-2017, we can undertake a 
microeconometric evaluation of bank-level sectoral credit allocation. We re-estimate Equation 
[3] using analogous bank-level dependent variables (loan shares), but we are unable to control 
for other bank level controls34. Table 9 contains the results of the bank-level regressions. In 
general, the model coefficients are consistent in terms of their signs, although some of the 
estimates lose statistical significance. The results indicate that the relationship between the 
three alternative boom measures and sectoral credit patterns is consistent with our previous 
findings: during oil booms, manufacturing (services) sector share of credit expand (contracted).  
[INSERT TABLE 9 HERE] 
6.6.Further estimation issues 
Although we employ an IV approach, we nonetheless consider the plausibility that our IV 
estimator might not fully alleviate the endogeneity of the boom measure. This problem is 
largely consistent with the reality that our data sample contains the two largest oil-dependent 
countries namely Saudi Arabia and Russia35. Hence, we conduct one final sensitivity test by 
re-estimating our baseline model with a data sample that excludes Saudi Arabia and Russia. 
                                                            
33 We contacted several central banks to obtain bank-level data, but the National Bank of Kazakhstan was the 
only source with a favourable response.. 
34 “According to p.2 Article 8 of the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan “On State Statistics” from March 19th, 
2010 №257-IV (further – the Law), using of primary statistical data on sectoral loan exposure in breakdown by 
respondents (in respect of one specific respondent) is prohibited. Also, in accordance with p.5 Article 8 of the 
Law, statistical information and databases that allow the respondent to be identified directly or indirectly or to 
determine the primary statistical data about him, are confidential and cannot be disseminated without the 
respondent's consent”: National Bank of Kazakhstan, February 2018. Accordingly, we were only granted 
anonymised monthly sectoral loan shares data across the different 32 banks, making it impossible to match the 
credit information to potentially publicly available data on bank-level characteristics. Hence, we are only able to 
control for sector-level factors such as sectoral output, exchange rate and average interest rate. 
35 Production numbers from the British Petroleum (BP)’s 2017 statistical bulletin revealed that both countries 
have historically accounted for around 26% of global oil production. 
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The re-estimated regression results are presented in Table 10. Again, the qualitative 
implications of our main findings remain intact: oil booms are associated with contraction 
(expansion) in manufacturing (service) sector share of bank credit.  
[INSERT TABLE 10 HERE] 
7. Concluding remarks and policy implications  
Banks play key functions in every economy by screening investment projects and allocating 
capital accordingly. As Stiglitz (1993) argued, if banks fail in these functions, the costs and 
implications to the economy are huge. It is therefore imperative to investigate the extent to 
which banking systems in resource rich countries efficiently allocate or intermediate resources 
during commodity booms. This issue is no less important for our understanding of the extent 
to which banks (fail to) intermediate these booms, as little is known about bank credit allocation 
behaviour during commodity price booms. Using banking sector-level data for a sample of 14 
oil producing countries, we provide the first comprehensive analysis of the effects of 
commodity booms on sectoral credit allocation.  
Our results show that the pattern of sectoral credit allocation during commodity booms 
are symptomatic of the Dutch disease: manufacturing (service) sector share of bank lending 
shrinks (expands) during periods of oil booms. Given these findings, we robustly reject the null 
hypotheses that banks play a role in countervailing the Dutch disease through their credit 
screening and efficient intermediation function. Consequently, we argue that credit allocation 
patterns during oil booms potentially constitute a channel through which the Dutch disease 
syndrome stagnates tradable sector investments and productivity performance.36 This pattern 
is also consistent with the view of a financial resource curse (Beck, 2011; Benigno and Fornato, 
2014). These findings are robust to a battery of robustness checks such as an instrumental 
                                                            
36 See Benigno and Fornato (2014) for some theoretical exposition on this idea.  
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variables approach which caters to heterogeneity and endogeneity concerns; alternative 
measures of oil boom, quantile regressions aimed at isolating our relationship of interest at 
different points in the conditional distribution of credit allocation, an alternative definition of 
the tradable sector, microeconometric evaluation, as well as running regressions that exclude 
large oil producers.   
Our results have important policy implications. First it should be clear that the strong 
rejection of our null hypothesis indicates that central banks across our sample have to take on 
the role of seeing beyond the boom as they cannot rely on the banks’ efficient capital allocation 
business to carry out countervailing policies. This appears consistent with the arguments by 
Benigno and Fornato (2014) for some form of interventions in the flow of productive resources 
across the economy to mitigate the misallocation of resources during an episode of financial 
resource curse.37 This idea seems justified since our results indicate that the observed capital 
allocation across the sampled countries might be well short of the “public good” function of 
the financial system. 
While our study constitutes the first comprehensive analysis of sectoral credit allocation 
across banking systems of oil rich countries, we recognize that the findings of this study may 
not apply to other commodity classes. Hence, it is hoped that future studies will aim to 
understand the behaviour of credit patterns during booms of other commodity types. 
Furthermore, it would also be interesting to place our results in the context of future research 
relying on alternative methods. In the long run, this would contribute to the evolution of a rich 
array of identification strategies for evaluating credit patterns arising from commodity booms. 
Also, future analogous analyses using bank-level data are required to further investigate micro-
level bank lending behaviour during commodity booms. With such microdata it would be 
                                                            
37 As Gylfason (2006) argues, resource-based economies can efficiently use resources/revenues from windfalls 
as buffer to smooth consumption over the boom-burst cycles that are prevalent in oil price movements.  
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interesting to unravel the channels through which commodity booms shape bank credit policies 
in the context of (i) foreign currency exposure (ii) market power and (iii) management quality. 
However, we are aware of the difficulty stemming from the lack of suitable microdata on 
sectoral lending spanning a reasonably long period38, required to conduct a meaningful analysis 
of commodity price shocks.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
38 For instance, Bureau Van Dijk’s major bank database Orbis Bank Focus which succeeds the legacy 
Bankscope database has only 6 years’ history for listed banks and 4 years for unlisted banks.  
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Appendix A 
Table A1: Variables definitions and data sources 
Variable Definition Source 
Banking sector-level data   
Agriculture share of credit  Ratio of banking sector loan to agricultural sector to total loans Monthly central bank statistical bulletins, several 
Manufacturing sector share of credit Ratio of total banking sector loan to manufacturing sector to total loans Monthly central bank statistical bulletins, several 
Service sector share of credit  Ratio of total banking sector loan to services sector to total loans Monthly central bank statistical bulletins, several 
Oil price boom  Spot oil price deviations from forecast prices EIA 
Real interest rate Average monthly lending rate Monthly central bank statistical bulletins, several 
Total deposits  Total value of banking sector deposits, including private and public-sector deposits Monthly central bank statistical bulletins, several 
Total capital  Total value of equity capital in the banking sector Monthly central bank statistical bulletins, several 
Real exchange rate Real effective exchange rate (REER) IMF-IFS 
Liquidity Ratio of broad money (M2) to international reserves Monthly central bank statistical bulletins, several 
Banking sector size Total assets Monthly central bank statistical bulletins, several 
OPEC  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the country is a member of OPEC, zero otherwise Authors’ calculation  
Institutional quality index Constructed by applying principal component analysis to World Governance indicators  Kaufmann et al. (2010) 
Manufacturing production index Production volume index (2012=100) Thomson Datastream 
Services output index Index of services sector output (2012=100) Thomson Datastream 
   
Instrumental variables   
Variable cost per barrel of oil in the US  US oil sector: (Total man hours * hourly wage * total oil produced)/(volume of oil produced) U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and EIA  
Global temperature  Monthly average global temperature  U.K. Met Office 
Total world oil rigs Count of operational oil rigs across the world  Baker Hughes, Inc. database 
   
WBES Firm-level data   
Cost Total operating cost  WBES 
Loan dependence  Ratio of firm total loan value to operating cost WBES 
   
Supplementary variables   
Consumer price index (CPI) Monthly consumer price indices IMF-IFS 
PPP conversion factors  PPP conversion factor, GDP (LCU per international $) WDI 
Country weights for boom Fuel exports (% of merchandise exports)  WDI 
Country weights for instruments Country oil reserves (% of global oil reserves) BP Annual Statistical Bulletin 
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Appendix B 
 
Table B1: Panel unit root tests 
 IPS  CIPS 
  Statistic p value   Statistic p value 
Boom -11.733* 0.000  -11.571* 0.000 
Manufacturing -5.324* 0.000  -5.196* 0.000 
Services -5.395* 0.000  -4.835* 0.000 
Exchange rate 0.234 0.408  -0.966 0.167 
Interest rate -5.713* 0.000  -8.674* 0.000 
Deposit -5.782* 0.000  -3.916* 0.000 
Capital -4.029* 0.000  -4.393* 0.000 
Liquidity -5.386 * 0.000  -3.931* 0.000 
Size -2.295* 0.011  -3.897* 0.004 
Institutional quality -2.481* 0.007  -2.588* 0.005 
Manufacturing index -12.565 0.000  -13.330* 0.000 
Services index -6.999* 0.000  -5.791* 0.000 
Notes: IPS refers to the panel unit root test of Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) and CIPS refers to the panel unit root test of Pesaran 
(2007) which accounts for cross-sectional dependence among sampled countries. *Rejection of the null hypothesis at 5% 
significance level. The 5% critical value for the IPS statistics is -1.730 and the 5% critical value for the CIPS statistics is -
2.120 
 
 
 
Table B2: Relationship between oil boom and instruments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This table presents the first stage regression of the oil price boom on employed instruments. Heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors are presented in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  1 2 3 
Temperature 4.439***   
 [0.675]   
Oil rigs  0.001***  
  [0.000]  
Variable cost   0.034*** 
   [0.004] 
Constant -0.049***  -0.093*** -0.120*** 
 [0.007] [0.013] [0.015] 
R-sqr 0.43 0.44 0.45 
N 2310 2310 2310 
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Appendix C 
Construction of institutional quality variable 
Our institutional quality measure is constructed by applying principal component analysis 
(PCA) to the World Governance indicators (WGI) (Kaufmann et al., 2010). The indicators 
cover six dimensions: (i) Voice and accountability (ii) Political stability (iii) Government 
effectiveness (iv) Regulatory quality (v) Rule of law and (vi) Control of corruption. One the 
one hand, using only one dimension of the WGI (e.g. regulatory quality) might prove 
inadequate in capturing the quality of institutions across sampled counties. On the other hand, 
including all five dimensions in the same regression poses the challenge of multicollinearity. 
Consequently, the PCA is a sensible compromise that eliminates the potential multicollinearity 
between the WGI dimensional measures, while also boosting the precision and efficiency of 
model estimations by reducing the number of RHS variables. The resulting composite variable 
employed in our regressions “Comp1” captures the common variation among the WGI 
indicators, as demonstrated by its eigenvalue of 4.27>1, as well accounting for 71% variation 
(Table C1).  
Table C1: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Comp1 4.28 3.27 0.71 0.71 
Comp2 1.01 0.62 0.17 0.88 
Comp3 0.39 0.22 0.07 0.95 
Comp4 0.17 0.09 0.03 0.97 
Comp5 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.99 
Comp6 0.07 - 0.01 1 
 
Although our analysis is based on monthly data, the institutional variable has an annual 
frequency, so we repeat the annual values for all 12 months in the corresponding year. This 
approach seems consistent with the fact that the quality of economic or political institutions is 
likely to embody some degree of persistence: i.e. changes are gradual or slow-changing (North, 
1994; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2010).  
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Appendix D 
Figure D1: Key events and the evolution of real oil prices 
 
 
 
 
Figure D2: Manufacturing sector share of loans versus oil boom 
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Figure D3: Service sector share of loans versus oil boom 
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Table 1:Income, oil contribution and financial development across countries, 2016. 
Source: BP annual statistical bulletin, World Bank Development Indicators (WDI) 
Country 
 
Per capita income 
(PPP, 2011=100) 
Share of world oil 
production (%) 
Oil share of total 
export (%) 
Credit to private 
sector (% of GDP) 
Azerbaijan 15994.00 0.90 87.10 25.40 
Bahrain 50719.12 0.02 50.35 73.72 
Brazil 14023.69 2.80 6.34 62.18 
Indonesia 10764.55 1.10 23.21 33.11 
Kazakhstan 23419.91 1.80 60.74 30.77 
Kuwait 35490.21 3.40 89.11 98.97 
Malaysia 25660.46 0.80 16.09 123.97 
Mexico 16831.12 2.70 6.07 26.80 
Nigeria 5438.92 2.20 90.85 15.64 
Norway 63810.8 0.03 53.00 145.0 
Qatar 118215.30 2.10 82.80 79.40 
Russia 24026.00 12.20 63.00 54.72 
Saudi Arabia 50458.17 13.40 78.40 57.98 
UAE 67133.07 4.40 42.50 85.89 
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Table 2:Summary Statistics for the variables used in the study 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
# of 
countries 
# of obs. 
Banking sector-level data       
Agriculture share of credit (%) 1.98 1.83 0.001 8.73 14 2310 
Manufacturing sector share of credit (%) 12.21 6.87 1.41 37.58 14 2310 
Service sector share of credit (%) 42.67 6.51 26.35 65.26 14 2310 
Oil price boom (%) 0.48 1.17 0.001 14.39 14 2310 
Real interest rate (%) 9.81 7.16 -3.44 47.54 14 2310 
Total deposits (billion, ppp $) 17.90 64.80 0.03 550 14 2310 
Total capital (billion, ppp $) 0.87 2.56 -0.02 20.40 14 2310 
Real exchange rate (index, 2012=100) 110.53 38.65 62.52 395.12 14 2310 
M2/Reserve  3.42 1.86 0.44 22.53 14 2310 
Total assets (billion, ppp $) 6.22 12.90 0.04 83.70 14 2310 
OPEC (Dummy=1, 0 otherwise) 0.42 0.49 0 1 14 2310 
Institutional quality  0.32 0.93 -1.68 2.01 14 2310 
Manufacturing index 93.32 13.67 51.08 130.05 14 2310 
Services index 92.78 23.04 20.62 195.66 14 2310 
       
Instrumental variables       
Real unit labour cost of per barrel of oil in the US ($, 2012=100) 100.58 7.78 67.48 117.84 14 2310 
Average global temperature (degree Celsius)  0.53 0.17 0.10 1.11 14 2310 
Total world oil rigs 2704.42 714.92 1156 3900              14 2310 
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Table 3:Oil price boom and credit allocation: Baseline regressions 
 
Notes: The dependent variables are the sector shares of total credit, defined as the ratio of manufacturing or services sector 
loans to total loans. The IV specifications use temperature, one and two lags, as well as lagged exchange rate. Kleibergen-Paap 
weak and underidentification LM and Wald tests are conducted under the null hypotheses that model is weakly identified and 
underidentified, respectively. Hansen test statistic of the over-identifying restrictions is asymptotically chi-square distributed 
under the null of instrument validity; p-values are reported in parentheses. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors reported 
in parenthesis are clustered for countries. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. 
  Manufacturing loan share   Services loan share 
 Variable OLS IV  OLS IV 
Boom -0.001* -0.011***  0.001** 0.008*** 
 [0.000] [0.003]  [0.000] [0.002] 
Deposit 0.012 0.012***  -0.007 -0.006* 
 [0.014] [0.004]  [0.014] [0.003] 
Capital 0.002 0.004***  0.005* 0.004*** 
 [0.004] [0.001]  [0.003] [0.001] 
Interest rate 0.152*** 0.129***  -0.087* -0.074*** 
 [0.042] [0.017]  [0.047] [0.022] 
Exchange rate -0.006 -0.012**  -0.004 -0.0001 
 [0.027] [0.006]  [0.020] [0.004] 
Liquidity -0.012*** -0.011***  0.006 0.005*** 
 [0.004] [0.001]  [0.004] [0.001] 
Size -0.010** -0.010***  0.004 0.004*** 
 [0.005] [0.001]  [0.005] [0.001] 
OPEC 0.096*** 0.093***  -0.052*** -0.049*** 
 [0.009] [0.006]  [0.007] [0.003] 
Institutions  0.004 0.004***  -0.006 -0.006*** 
 [0.005] [0.001]  [0.004] [0.001] 
Sector output index  0.001 0.003  0.007 0.003 
 [0.018] [0.005]  [0.010] [0.005] 
      
(Centered) 𝑅2 0.61 0.53  0.48 0.40 
Month dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Under id test: KP LM statistic  35.01   33.79 
Weak id test: KP LM statistic  25.48   24.87 
Over id test: Hansen J statistic  0.03   0.04 
Hansen J-test (p-value)  [0.86]   [0.84] 
Excluded Instrument   Weather   Weather 
N 2310 2310  2310 2310 
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Table 4. Robustness test: Quantile regression for manufacturing sector credit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the ratio of manufacturing sector loan to total loans. The results are based on quantile regression approach reported in columns 2-10. Consistent standard errors 
which are reported in the brackets are obtained using bootstrapping. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively
 Quantile 
  0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Boom -0.0002 -0.0017*** -0.0021** -0.0019* -0.0015 -0.0019* -0.0019* -0.0028*** -0.0018 
 [0.0004] [0.006] [0.009] [0.008] [0.0010] [0.0011] [0.0010] [0.009] [0.0012] 
Deposit -0.0014*** -0.0028*** -0.0045*** -0.0054*** -0.0039*** -0.0040*** -0.0026*** -0.0013 -0.0032** 
 [0.0004] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0006] [0.0005] [0.0006] [0.0005] [0.0012] [0.0013] 
Capital 0.0133*** 0.0163*** 0.0180*** 0.0197*** 0.0241*** 0.0284*** 0.0300*** 0.0310*** 0.0220*** 
 [0.0008] [0.0012] [0.0009] [0.0014] [0.0019] [0.0016] [0.0026] [0.0054] [0.0081] 
Interest rate 0.1215*** 0.1209*** 0.1495*** 0.1610*** 0.1488*** 0.1154*** 0.0387** 0.0301 0.0020 
 [0.0118] [0.0146] [0.0251] [0.0185] [0.0195] [0.0219] [0.0172] [0.0238] [0.0175] 
Exchange rate -0.0017 0.0022 -0.0076* -0.0112 -0.0413*** -0.0507*** -0.0862*** -0.1083*** -0.0905*** 
 [0.0037] [0.0045] [0.0040] [0.0077] [0.0042] [0.0055] [0.0081] [0.0110] [0.0084] 
Liquidity -0.0087*** -0.0126*** -0.0146*** -0.0168*** -0.0221*** -0.0248*** -0.0154*** -0.0082** 0.0001 
 [0.0019] [0.0025] [0.0016] [0.0022] [0.0027] [0.0016] [0.0026] [0.0031] [0.0037] 
Size -0.0019* -0.0035*** -0.0042*** -0.0050*** -0.0091*** -0.0120*** -0.0097*** -0.0076 0.0056 
 [0.0010] [0.0012] [0.0006] [0.0010] [0.0014] [0.0017] [0.0025] [0.0066] [0.0090] 
OPEC -0.0475*** -0.0466*** -0.0400*** -0.0376*** -0.0435*** -0.0471*** -0.0492*** -0.0439*** -0.0473*** 
 [0.0028] [0.0025] [0.0027] [0.0037] [0.0032] [0.0033] [0.0041] [0.0036] [0.0041] 
Institutions  0.0001 -0.0010* 0.0015 0.0025* 0.0027** 0.0012 0.0012 -0.0042 -0.0057 
 [0.0004] [0.0006] [0.0011] [0.0014] [0.0011] [0.0012] [0.0020] [0.0034] [0.0036] 
Sectoral output index  0.0492*** 0.0571*** 0.0445*** 0.0025* 0.0027** 0.0012 0.0012 -0.0042 -0.0057 
 [0.0059] [0.0077] [0.0098] [0.0014] [0.0011] [0.0012] [0.0020] [0.0034] [0.0036] 
Constant 0.0247 0.0251 0.0734*** 0.0914*** 0.2332*** 0.2858*** 0.3882*** 0.4332*** 0.3099*** 
 [0.0170] [0.0225] [0.0176] [0.0329] [0.0229] [0.0245] [0.0295] [0.0612] [0.0501] 
N 2310 2310 2310 2310 2310 2310 2310 2310 2310 
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Table 5. Robustness test: Quantile regression for services sector credit 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the ratio of services sector loan to total loans. The results are based on quantile regression approach reported in columns 2-10. Consistent standard errors which 
are reported in the brackets are obtained using bootstrapping. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
 Quantile 
  0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Boom 0.0008** 0.0005 0.0013 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0002 0.0011*** 0.0001 
 [0.0003] [0.0005] [0.0010] [0.0006] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0007] [0.0003] [0.0002] 
Deposit 0.0030*** 0.0006 -0.0005 0.0012* 0.0019*** 0.0021*** 0.0024*** 0.0025*** 0.0021*** 
 [0.0010] [0.0013] [0.0008] [0.0007] [0.0004] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0002] 
Capital -0.0187*** -0.0196*** -0.0185*** -0.0144*** -0.0131*** -0.0114*** -0.0099*** -0.0074*** -0.0051*** 
 [0.0016] [0.0026] [0.0022] [0.0019] [0.0010] [0.0008] [0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0006] 
Interest rate -0.4228*** -0.1468** -0.0978*** -0.1098*** -0.1581*** -0.1788*** -0.2062*** -0.1928*** -0.1577*** 
 [0.0694] [0.0650] [0.0230] [0.0275] [0.0165] [0.0133] [0.0110] [0.0114] [0.0127] 
Exchange rate 0.0639*** 0.0659*** 0.0566*** 0.0392*** 0.0209*** 0.0150*** 0.0098*** 0.0058** 0.0068*** 
 [0.0069] [0.0045] [0.0043] [0.0061] [0.0031] [0.0033] [0.0034] [0.0024] [0.0018] 
Liquidity 0.0131*** 0.0108*** 0.0086*** 0.0114*** 0.0138*** 0.0141*** 0.0141*** 0.0140*** 0.0125*** 
 [0.0040] [0.0029] [0.0021] [0.0021] [0.0014] [0.0007] [0.0013] [0.0009] [0.0004] 
Size -0.0002 0.0043 0.0071** 0.0040** 0.0044*** 0.0036*** 0.0025*** 0.0005 -0.0012* 
 [0.0021] [0.0031] [0.0025] [0.0017] [0.0009] [0.006] [0.0008] [0.0010] [0.0007] 
OPEC 0.0213*** 0.0202*** 0.0203*** 0.0242*** 0.0214*** 0.0200*** 0.0223*** 0.0237*** 0.0234*** 
 [0.0043] [0.0034] [0.0033] [0.0029] [0.0026] [0.0011] [0.0022] [0.0016] [0.0009] 
Institutions  -0.0043 0.0097** 0.0141*** 0.0073*** 0.0080*** 0.0079*** 0.0060*** 0.0028*** 0.0018*** 
 [0.0037] [0.0047] [0.0023] [0.0017] [0.0013] [0.0007] [0.0013] [0.0006] [0.0003] 
Sectoral output index  -0.0633*** -0.0647*** -0.0538*** -0.0486*** -0.0334*** -0.0250*** -0.0241** -0.0274 -0.0521*** 
 [0.0119] [0.0050] [0.0038] [0.0064] [0.0062] [0.0057] [0.0083] [0.0146] [0.0127] 
Constant 0.2919*** 0.2413*** 0.2543*** 0.3112*** 0.3751*** 0.4145*** 0.4484*** 0.4673*** 0.4577*** 
 [0.0420] [0.0306] [0.0236] [0.0245] [0.0155] [0.0148] [0.0179] [0.0135] [0.0093] 
N 2310 2310 2310 2310 2310 2310 2310 2310 2310 
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Table 6:Robustness test: Alternative boom measures. 
 
 
 
 
  Manufacturing loan share   Services loan share 
  Hamilton Break-even   Hamilton Break-even 
Boom -0.1318*** -0.0512***  0.0896*** 0.0365*** 
 [0.0349]  [0.0120]  [0.0228]    [0.0081] 
Deposit 0.0056 0.0091***  -0.0010 -0.0039 
 [0.0037] [0.0033]  [0.0034] [0.0032] 
Capital 0.0021** -0.0018  0.0052*** 0.0081*** 
 [0.0010] [0.0014]  [0.0009] [0.0012] 
Interest rate 0.1534*** 0.1710***  -0.0806*** -0.1010*** 
 [0.0165] [0.0194]  [0.0219] [0.0256] 
Exchange rate -0.0172*** -0.0218***  0.0032 0.0065 
 [0.0061] [0.0064]  [0.0048] [0.0050] 
Liquidity -0.0127*** -0.0168***  0.0069*** 0.0095*** 
 [0.0012] [0.0016]  [0.0011] [0.0013] 
Size -0.0109*** -0.0105***  0.0043*** 0.0039*** 
 [0.0013] [0.0012]  [0.0011] [0.0011] 
OPEC 0.0894*** 0.0937***  -0.0478*** -0.0503*** 
 [0.0057] [0.0054]  [0.0033] [0.0031] 
Institutions  0.0041*** 0.0041***  -0.0063*** -0.0065*** 
 [0.0008] [0.0007]  [0.0006] [0.0006] 
Sector output 0.0038 0.0049  0.0116** 0.0053 
 [0.0053] [0.0052]  [0.0053] [0.0055] 
(Centered) 𝑅2 0.56 0.57  0.41 0.44 
Month dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Under id test: KP LM statistic 71.88 113.86  77.71 113.63 
Weak id test: KP LM statistic 29.50 58.32  32.90 58.56 
Over id test: Hansen J statistic 0.01 0.14  0.01 0.19 
Hansen J-test (p-value) [0.93] [0.71]  [0.90] [0.66] 
Excluded Instrument  Weather Weather  Weather Weather 
N 2282 2282   2282 2282 
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Table 7:Robustness test: IV Alternative tradeable sector. 
  
  FE-IV 
Boom -0.0133** 
 [0.0060] 
Deposit 0.0074*** 
 [0.0028] 
Capital -0.0010 
 [0.0013] 
Interest rate 0.0340* 
 [0.0191] 
Exchange rate -0.0028 
 [0.0035] 
Liquidity 0.0008 
 [0.0014] 
Size -0.0026** 
 [0.0012] 
OPEC 0.0038** 
 [0.0018] 
Institutions  0.00002 
 [0.0004] 
Sector index -0.0090*** 
 [0.0015] 
  
(Centered) 𝑅2 0.36 
Month dummies Yes 
Year dummies Yes 
Country dummies Yes 
Under id test: KP LM statistic 9.12 
Weak id test: KP LM statistic 13.34 
Over id test: Hansen J statistic 0.68 
Hansen J-test (p-value) [0.41] 
Instrument  Oil rig & cost 
N 2296 
Notes: This table reports IV robustness tests of oil price boom and credit using an alternative tradeable sector- agricultural 
sector. The independent variables are analogous to those in Table 3, while the dependent variable is agricultural sector share 
of total credit: defined as the ratio of manufacturing or services sector loans to total loans. We use lagged values of variable 
cost of oil production and global oil rig counts as instruments. Kleibergen-Paap weak and underidentification LM and Wald 
tests are conducted under the null hypotheses that model is weakly identified and underidentified. Hansen test statistic of the 
over-identifying restrictions is asymptotically chi-square distributed under the null of instrument validity; p-values are reported 
in parentheses. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors reported in parenthesis are clustered for countries. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 8:Bank loan dependence in some oil-rich countries 
 
 
Notes: This table reports the loan dependence across some of the countries in our data sample. Source: World Bank Enterprise 
Surveys  
Sample Mean Std. Dev. # of firms % with loans 
Whole sample 0.06 0.20 1415 46% 
Azerbaijan 0.03 0.11 88 24% 
Brazil 0.10 0.18 452 78% 
Nigeria 0.04 0.18 60 27% 
Indonesia 0.04 0.17 406 51% 
Kazakhstan   0.08 0.31 81 25% 
Mexico 0.07 0.19 189 58% 
Russia 0.09 0.25 103 52% 
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Table 9:Sectoral loan allocation in the Kazakh banking industry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This table reports OLS regressions on the relationship between alternative oil price boom measures and sectoral credit shares. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors reported in parenthesis are 
clustered for countries. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
  Manufacturing   Agriculture   Service 
  Spot-forecast Hamilton Break-even  Spot-forecast Hamilton Break-even  Spot-forecast Hamilton Break-even 
Boom -0.013 -0.604*** -0.621***  -0.032 -0.398* -0.374  0.010 0.505*** 0.502*** 
 [0.040] [0.158] [0.130]  [0.026] [0.241] [0.283]  [0.025] [0.140] [0.177] 
Interest -0.023 -0.012 -0.037  0.282 0.312 0.295  -0.145 -0.163 -0.143 
 [0.374 [0.381] [0.382]  [0.396] [0.409] [0.403]  [0.267] [0.275] [0.272] 
Exchange rate 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.000 [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Sector output 0.038 0.035 0.041  -0.022 -0.017 -0.017  -0.004 -0.009 -0.010 
 [0.063 [0.063] [0.063]  [0.040] [0.043] [0.043]  [0.017] [0.018] [0.018] 
Constant -0.290 -0.249 -0.306  0.125 0.094 0.098  0.461 0.484 0.488 
 [0.623 [0.621] [0.623]  [0.230] [0.246] [0.245]  [0.083] [0.089] [0.087] 
Observations 3240 3240 3240  3240 3240 3240  3240 3240 3240 
R-sqrd 0.030 0.032 0.031  0.029 0.030 0.029  0.016 0.020 0.018 
Banks 34 34 34  34 34 34  34 34 34 
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Table 10:Sectoral credit allocation regressions excluding Russia and Saudi Arabia 
  Manufacturing Agriculture Services 
Boom -0.0093*** -0.0106*** 0.0069*** 
 [0.0024] [0.0036] [0.0019] 
Deposit -0.0024 0.0091*** 0.0076** 
 [0.0037] [0.0025] [0.0033] 
Capital 0.0007 -0.0017** 0.0048*** 
 [0.0012] [0.0008] [0.0010] 
Interest rate 0.1114*** 0.0417** -0.0510*** 
 [0.0131] [0.0168] [0.0183] 
Exchange rate -0.0138*** -0.0027 -0.0153*** 
 [0.0049] [0.0026] [0.0039] 
Liquidity -0.0112*** -0.0018 -0.0026 
 [0.0018] [0.0012] [0.0017] 
Size -0.0088*** -0.0028*** 0.0010 
 [0.0012] [0.0010] [0.0010] 
OPEC 0.0878*** 0.0048*** -0.0468*** 
 [0.0050] [0.0015] [0.0029] 
Institutions  -0.0009 0.0007* -0.0045*** 
 [0.0007] [0.0004] [0.0007] 
Sector index 0.0022 -0.0102*** 0.0108** 
 [0.0051] [0.0015] [0.0053] 
    
(Centered) 𝑅2 0.65 0.48 0.34 
Month dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Under id test: KP LM statistic 35.43 34.17 13.51 
Weak id test: KP LM statistic 27.59 26.39 10.44 
Over id test: Hansen J statistic 0.043 2.29 0.16 
Hansen J-test (p-value) [0.98] [0.98] [0.69] 
Instrument  Weather Oil cost and rig Weather 
N 1930 1930 1930 
This table reports robustness tests of oil price boom and credit using a parsimonious data sample which excludes Russia and 
Saudi Arabia. The dependent variables are analogous to those in Tables 3-7. Kleibergen-Paap weak and underidentification 
LM and Wald tests are conducted under the null hypotheses that model is weakly identified and underidentified. Hansen test 
statistic of the over-identifying restrictions is asymptotically chi-square distributed under the null of instrument validity; p-
values are reported in parentheses. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors reported in parenthesis are clustered for 
countries. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
 
